Introduction
Economists have long been interested in the connection between technological progress and economic growth. This in turn has led to an interest in the process by which these are linked, and by which new or existing knowledge is commercially applied in the process of innovation.
Within the field of innovation, one of the areas most researched by economists has been the determinants of the pattern and extent of innovation between industries, much of this revolving around the Schumpeterian hypotheses that large firm size and/or industrial concentration encourage innovation.
1 This paper retains the insights to be gained from this literature, but attempts to broaden the perspective on the determinants of innovation to allow for factors not normally considered in 'traditional' economic analysis: networking and collaborative activities between firms which may be complements to, or substitutes for, research and development by the firm itself. These factors are considered with reference to the 'new institutional' economics, which recognises that institutional routines and social conventions have important roles to play in shaping economic activity, and gives prominence to, inter alia, transaction costs and property rights in the development of such activity.
The insights of the new institutional literature are applied to an examination of the patterns of networking and collaboration in the innovation process among a large sample of British, Irish and German manufacturing plants. These patterns are found to vary substantially between the countries, as is the extent of innovation at plant level. National differences in the internal and external organisation of the innovation process appear to be linked to different institutional structures in the UK and Germany, and to different perceptions of the transaction costs and property rights issues underlying these institutional structures.
An economics perspective on innovation networks
Underlying much of the conventional economic research in this area is an essentially linear view of the innovation process, in which the promise of higher future rewards encourages firms to invest in the necessary R&D to generate innovations. This gives rise to the concept of the ëinnovation production functioní, which relates the inputs to the innovation process to the outputs (innovations) in a relatively mechanistic manner. A typical formulation is that of Geroski (1990) , who suggests the following relationships for any set of industries indexed by i: logSi = α0 + α1 logπ e i + α2Mi + α3Zi
(1) Ii = β logSi + µ
where Si is research activity, π e i, is the expected post-innovation returns, Mi is the degree of monopoly power in the industry, and Zi is a vector of other relevant factors. Thus research (usually 1 More recently the focus of interest in much of the economics literature has been on the use of innovation as a strategic weapon, often couched in terms of game-theoretic analyses of ëpatent racesí. measured as R&D expenditure per sales) is a function principally of the expected profit from innovation and of the industrial structure of the sector 2 , and innovation in turn depends on R&D.
There are two related assumptions underlying this approach: the first is that innovations come primarily from significant scientific or technological discoveries, and the second is that R&D is both a necessary and sufficient condition for innovation to occur. Both of these assumptions can be challenged. There is evidence not only that the majority of commercially significant innovation is actually incremental in nature, involving the development, application and re-application of existing knowledge with little or no scientific advance (Audretsch, 1995) , but also that emphasising the activities of formal research laboratories can substantially underestimate the R&D input and innovativeness of smaller firms (Kleinknecht, 1987) , leading to a distorted picture of the relationship between R&D, firm size and innovation.
In addition, the linear view of innovation fails to allow for the possibility that innovationespecially of an incremental kind -may come from sources which have at best an indirect link with any formal R&D process. Two possible sources are considered here; technology transfer and networking. Evolutionary models of the innovation process suggest the potential importance of technology transfers and networks as sources of new technical knowledge, in addition to an enterprise's own R&D effort (Todtling, 1992) . The literature on regional aspects of innovation stresses the possible benefits of technology transfer from parent corporations to branch plants, arising from, inter alia, access to R&D facilities operated by the parent or proprietary knowledge developed by the parent, from contacts with external research establishments maintained by the parent, or by being the direct recipients of innovations developed elsewhere in the group (Thwaites, 1978 , Oakey et al, 1980 . Empirical research suggests this may in part explain the higher innovation rates recorded for multiplant corporations in both the UK and Switzerland compared with their independent indigenous counterparts (Goddard et al, 1986; Brugger and Stuckey, 1987) , with the latter study stressing the crucial role of intensive exchange of information within the corporation.
Networks can also be a method of enhancing the potential for innovation without necessarily engaging in R&D. The term 'innovation network' has no universally accepted definition, but the recent review by Freeman (1991) suggests that some degree of consensus is emerging in the use of the term. Networks may be regarded as a form of institutional structure involving a market or quasi-market relationship between firms, the purpose of which is to overcome jointly the uncertainty involved in the innovation process. These are explicit arrangements, which do not include the informal information-sharing arrangements which sometimes exist between firms and their local higher education establishments, or tacit links between firms in a local area 3 . The concern is thus with formal innovation networks, but which fall short of full-scale merger or any other form of equity sharing arrangement; specifically, the focus is on collaborative or subcontracting relationships between plants unrelated by ownership (Roper et al, 1996, pp 24-34) . Technology transfer is therefore an intra-firm phenomenon while networking involves inter-firm relationships.
Reviewing the empirical research on innovation networks since the pioneering SAPPHO project of the 1960s, Freeman (1991) highlights certain key features of this institutional arrangement. First, "...both empirical and theoretical research has long since demonstrated the importance for successful innovation of both external and internal networks of information and collaboration." (p 501). Second, the evidence indicates that the use of external networks tends to be just as important for firms engaging in in-house R&D as for those with no R&D capacity. Third, involvement in innovation networking arrangements have increased markedly during the 1980s and 1990s, and have extended to many countries. Finally, networking can be equally effective between firms of roughly equal size, as in the case of Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1991) or between large and small firms (Lawton Smith et al , 1991) .
Three possible approaches to innovation have therefore been identified: R&D, technology transfer and networking. Formal analysis from the economics tradition puts the emphasis firmly on the first of these, but to ignore the possible influence of the others might have the effect of overstating the strength of the link between R&D (and possibly size and monopoly power) and innovation. However, to consider these alternative approaches to innovation does not require us to abandon economic analysis entirely.
Parker and Vaidya (1999) review other theoretical approaches from an economics perspective, some of which are more amenable to a networks-oriented view of the innovation process. Among these is the transaction-cost perspective, which examines the costs involved in managing internal R&D versus those incurred in contractual research agreements with other parties. This literature emphasises the problems of bargaining and of incomplete contracts in market transacting, with considerable weight being given to the danger of ëhold-upí which may arise from transactionspecific investments under conditions of uncertainty (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1979) . By their very nature, contracts involving R&D tend to be highly incomplete because of the uncertainty of the research process, and may be characterised by substantial investment in both physical and human specific capital. Teece (1988) highlights the problem of ëlock-iní under these conditions: because of the tacit knowledge acquired by a contracting party in any external R&D arrangement, there may be very high transaction costs to incur should the other party seek to terminate the contract for reasons of underperformance. What is more, the highly uncertain nature of R&D makes satisfactory contract completion difficult to define, possibly leading to a preference for market over hierarchy even where rent-seeking opportunism is not a major threat. This is supported by the empirical work of Audretsch et al (1996) , who find evidence that the existence of firm-specific human capital is negatively related to the use of external R&D. Parker and Vaidya (1999) correctly argue that the simple transaction-cost perspective cannot by itself provide the full answer to the use of hierarchy versus market and/or network in any given situation, first because the transaction cost approach puts all the emphasis on costs rather then the benefits to be gained from any governance structure, and secondly because of the relatively static nature of transaction cost analysis and its failure to take account of the dynamics of institutional change and development. To this could be added the excessive preoccupation of much of the transaction-cost literature with the existence of opportunism 4 as a necessary condition for the existence of transaction costs and so the evolution of non-market or quasi-market institutional structures. However, some attempts have been made to preserve the integrity of the transaction cost approach yet adapt to these criticisms. Love (1995 Love ( , 1997 argues that transaction costs can exist in circumstances where opportunism is not present, as in the case of technology transfer between parties of vastly different technological capability. The problem here can be genuine differences of opinion over contract completion under conditions of extreme uncertainty, giving rise to what Langlois (1992) calls ëdynamic transaction costsí, i.e. ìthe costs of not having the capabilities you need when you need themî (Langlois 1992 p 124). 5 Clearly this is heading more towards a ëcapabilitiesí or resource-based approach to the theory of networks and the firm, which overcomes some of the limitations of transaction cost analysis. But even this more dynamic approach does not tell the full story: we must acknowledge that there is a key role to be played by issues of appropriability, that is the firmís ability to protect and exploit the property rights arising as a result of its research. All firms have reason to fear the possible dissipation of rents which may result from disclosure of R&D findings by a research partner or subcontractor, especially when the research is tacit knowledge embedded in individuals (Teece, 1988) . Avoidance of such mechanisms is clearly one method of protection from this problem, but at the cost of failing to take advantage of the cost and risk-sharing advantages of a partner. Kogut (1988) argues that joint ventures will be an appropriate method of engaging in collaborative research, because such mechanisms possess two key advantages over a long-term contractual relationship 6 where there is a high degree of uncertainty over specifying and monitoring performance. First, the joint venture involves mutual commitment of resources (financial and/or personnel), and secondly there are joint ownership and control rights to the outcome of the research. Together, these two attributes give rise to a ëmutual hostage positioní in which neither party has an incentive to shirk on the quantity or quality of their input to the venture (i.e. to act opportunistically) because such action will harm the residual value of the joint venture to the detriment of both parties. Unlike long-term contracts there is no need to specify ex ante the precise quantity and quality of inputs at every stage: ìInstead, the initial commitments and rules of profit sharing are specified, along with administrative procedures for control and evaluationî (Kogut, 1988, p 321) . 4 Opportunism goes beyond mere self-interest and includes an element of ëguileí (i.e. deceitfulness or cunning). The transaction-cost approach does not assume that all parties act opportunistically at all times, but that the threat of opportunistic behaviour may require costs to be incurred by contracting parties in order to avoid its effects. 5 The view that opportunism is not necessary to give rise to transaction costs has subsequently become more widely accepted e.g. Conner and Prahalad (1996) and the resulting debate in Organization Science. 6 Kogut sees such a contractual relationship as the most likely alternative to a joint venture in the case of R&D.
There has been some recent empirical research by economists in Europe which considers the effect of networking and other forms of collaboration on the innovation performance of firms. The importance of this work lies in its retaining the theoretical and statistical rigour of economics, while allowing for the insights on networking to be gained from other approaches. Results are mixed. Arvanitis and Hollenstein (1996) find some positive effect on innovation among Swiss firms which use other firms as external sources of knowledge on which to base innovation, but that this effect tends to be much greater for small firms. They interpret this as a property rights issue, with larger firms more able to generate the appropriate knowledge base from internal sources, and more willing to do so to protect the property rights which develop as a result. By contrast, Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1996) find virtually no influence, either positive or negative, of R&D collaboration or any other form of technology transfer mechanism on the innovativeness of firms in the Netherlands. They also interpret this as an issue of appropriability, arguing that only ëweakí innovators will seek partners because of the need to share the spoils of any resulting collaboration. Contrasting with these findings, Love and Roper (1999) find evidence of considerable use of networking and technology transfer among innovating manufacturing plants in the UK, and that these mechanisms substitute to some extent for R&D effort at the plant level.
7 This study employs a two-stage modelling procedure; first, the determinants of R&D, technology transfer and networking intensity are estimated at the plant level, which produces strong evidence that technology transfer and networking are substitutes for, not complements to, R&D in the innovation process. Omitting these important alternatives to research input is therefore likely to over-estimate the effect of R&D on the extent and/or likelihood of innovation. This is important, because the second stage of the econometric estimation indicates that both technology transfer and networking exhibit a positive effect on innovation performance at plant level, independent of the contribution of R&D. This is strongly supportive of the view that the traditional economics view of a linear relationship between R&D and innovation is at best a partial explanation of the whole picture.
Studies such as these suggest that it is possible to retain an economist's perspective on the innovation process and its determinants, yet capture to some extent the subtlety of the networking and technology transfer processes which take place within and between firms. However, they are clearly incomplete for (at least) two reasons. First, these studies concentrate largely on inter-firm or intra-group links in the innovation process, with virtually no emphasis on the nature of network linkages within the individual innovating plant or firm.
8 Secondly, few of these studies allow comparative analysis across innovating establishments in different countries; doing so would allow the effects of institutional and policy differences on innovation networks and technology transfer mechanisms to be seen in perspective, and possibly permit conclusions to be drawn which are not available to a single-country study. The remainder of this paper describes the relevant information gleaned from one of the most comprehensive studies of new product development ever carried out in Europe, involving a large-scale survey of manufacturing plants in the UK, Ireland and Germany, which permits some preliminary conclusions on these comparative issues
The Product Development Survey
The Product Development Survey (PDS) is a postal survey of over 15,000 manufacturing establishments in the UK, Ireland and Germany, and was conducted between November 1994 and April 1995. 9 The purpose of the study was to discover the extent of product innovation and development at each plant, and develop indicators of how this development was organised both internally and externally. In each country the sample was structured to allow size-band, regional and industry sector comparisons. Overall response rates of 20.6 per cent in the UK (1722 responses), 25.1 per cent in Germany (1374 responses) and 32.0 per cent in Ireland (533 responses) were achieved. Prior to the analysis survey responses were weighted to allow for sample structuring and differential response rates. Weights for each industry/size-band cell were constructed by comparing sample responses and the 1993 target population of manufacturing firms in each country. The weights were subsequently modified to reflect differences in industrial structure between the UK, Germany and Ireland. Full details of the sampling and weighting processes can be found in Roper et al (1996) .
The earlier discussion of the innovation process has implications for how innovation outputs are to be defined and measured. Measures such as R&D expenditure or employment have the double disadvantage of relying on the linear, technology-driven view of innovation, and of having no necessary link to any tangible innovation output (Mansfield, 1984) . Patent counts have the advantage of being a clear output indicator from a technological development process but may or may not result in the commercialisation or any positive economic advantage. In the PDS the process of innovation is regarded as a business activity related to, and affecting, firms' competitive position. This reflects recent official thinking in the UK (Department of Trade and Industry, 1992) , and research from the United States which suggests that almost 90 per cent of commercially significant innovations in manufacturing industry are modest improvements designed to update existing products (Audretsch, 1995) . The selected measure of innovation outputs must therefore allow for aspects of innovation which are not necessarily tied to R&D, should reflect the commercial importance of adaptation, improvement and rapid imitation, and should be a direct output-based measure of the extent of innovation. Innovation is therefore defined as the number of new or improved products introduced at plant level over the period 1991 to 1993. Table 1 shows the extent of innovation by country and plant size-band. German plants display a higher proportion of innovating firms in all size-bands, a tendency noted in previous studies of the same countries (Roper and Hofmann, 1993) , and which has been interpreted as being in part a reflection of German firms' greater commitment to the process of R&D and innovation (Roper, 1997) . 10 As with numerous previous studies of innovation (e.g, Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Acs 9 The survey was funded by a grant under the EUís KONVER initiative. 10 It seems unlikely that these differences can be explained by macro-economic factors. The three economies were at different phases of the economic cycle during the relevant period (1991-93), with Germany experiencing a sharp downturn in manufacturing output while UK output was almost static and that of Ireland growing steadily. A priori, one would expect this to reduce the relative innovation performance of German firms.
and Audretsch, 1988; Love et al, 1996) , the PDS suggests that the proportion of innovators increases monotonically with plant size; it is also clear that the relatively low level of innovation recorded by UK plants results entirely from the poor innovation performance of the 20-99 employee plants, which have a markedly lower incidence of innovation than their Irish and German counterparts. Table 2 shows the number of innovations per employee by establishment size-band. For all countries small plants show a markedly higher level of activity per employee than large plants: overall, establishments with less than 500 employees have an average of 0.33 innovations per employee, 6.6 times higher than that for plants with 500 or more employees (average of 0.05). This is precisely the ratio found by Acs and Audretsch (1988) when considering only the most innovative industries in their US sample: overall, Acs and Audrestch found that 'small' (less than 500 employees) plants had just 43 per cent more innovations per employee than large plants.
The average number of innovations per employee among UK respondents was approximately double that of Irish and German respondents. The data in Table 2 suggest that this is principally a function of the smallest size cohort, where innovations per employee shows the largest national variation. Particularly intriguing here is the very high level of innovations per employee among small British plants (twice that of the other countries), while Table 1 indicated that this cohort was largely responsible for the low proportion of innovators among British establishments. This may suggest that the smallest UK plants have some particular difficulty in producing a new or improved product in the first instance, but that once they overcome this initial hurdle they are relatively innovation intensive. This is not a feature of other countries or size-bands.
The crucial role played R&D in the innovation process within the conventional economics paradigm was highlighted earlier. The PDS provides information both on whether responding plants performed any in-house R&D, and on how this was organised i.e. in a formal R&D department or an a more ad hoc basis. The presence of a formal R&D department suggests a more systematic approach to the innovation process, which may be associated with improved R&D performance (Table 3) . In considering the pattern of results obtained here it is important to bear in mind that the PDS was a plant rather than company based survey, and so the pattern of industrial ownership between areas will affect the profile of collaboration opportunities available to individual plants. For example, the higher the degree of external ownership within a region, the greater will be the potential for plants within that region to take advantage of specialised group facilities for R&D or other forms of technology transfer. The potential importance of this is illustrated by the differences in the degree of external control of manufacturing capacity between the regions of the UK. In Scotland, 70 per cent of manufacturing employment is in plants owned by companies located outside the region (Ashcroft and Love, 1993 ), compared to 45 per cent in Northern Ireland and 50 per cent in Ireland (Murshed et al , 1993) . Among respondents to the PDS, 85 per cent of German plants were single establishment enterprises compared to 52 and 56 per cent respectively in the UK and Ireland. While this pattern suggests that fewer German plants will be able to take advantage of group facilities than in the UK or Ireland, its wider impact on either R&D or the innovation process is less clear ex ante. German single-plant companies might adopt independent strategies, internalising R&D and other elements of the innovation process: alternatively, they might substitute other external relations for the intra-group connections which are more readily available in the UK and Irish respondent plants. Table 3 suggests that, despite these differences in ownership structure, there was little overall variation in the percentage of plants undertaking R&D. 11 Two points are of interest, however.
First, for each country and size-band, the proportion of firms undertaking in-house R&D is less than the proportion of innovating firms (c.f. Table 1) , lending support to the contention that inhouse R&D is not a necessary condition for innovation to occur. 12 Secondly, there are clear national differences in the extent to which formal R&D departments were established at plant level, with German plants on average more than twice as likely than their UK or Irish counterparts to have an R&D department as opposed to a more informal product development arrangement, with the difference strongest among the 20-99 employment size-band. This pattern of R&D commitment may in part reflect national variations in public policy support for innovation, with German policy more geared towards mutual co-operation between small and medium-sized enterprises rather than the UK model in which support for basic or pre-competitive support tends to be biased towards large firms (Roper, 1997; Ashcroft et al, 1995) . However, in conjunction with the evidence below on patterns of internal and external networking, this may indicate a fundamentally different approach to the innovation and R&D process among British and German firms respectively.
Innovating firms in the PDS sample were asked for details of their external relationships with other firms during a variety of stages of the innovation process (Table 4) . Each firm was asked to identify whether it employed intra-group linkages (i.e. technology transfer linkages), and two forms of networking linkages; collaborative or sub-contract. In the transaction-cost terminology these two forms can be regarded as quasi-hierarchy and market respectively. At all stages of the innovation process there was evidence of intra-group and extra-group linkages among a minority of innovating plants, with the proportion of plants engaging in some form of collaboration varying from 11.9 per cent (production engineering -UK) to 27.5 per cent (identifying new productsGermany). The pattern here again shows clear evidence of national variations. As might be expected because of the much higher incidence of independent firms in the German sample, plants from that country showed a markedly lower tendency to use technology transfer linkages than either UK or Irish plants. More interesting, however, is the pattern of networking contacts across the three countries. German plants were heavily involved in collaborative mechanisms with other firms, especially in the early stages of the innovation process, with a very limited use of subcontracting relationships. While Irish and British plants also generally showed some preference for quasi-hierarchical collaborative arrangements over sub-contracting, this difference was much less marked than for the German sample; for example, the proportion of UK and Irish plants using collaboration in the early stages of innovation averages around one quarter of the German sample. The Irish and UK sample also showed an absolutely greater tendency to use the market approach.
This may in part reflect the fact that public policy support for R&D and product development in Germany has generally been available only for projects involving inter-firm collaboration (Keck, 11 Although UK and Irish firms were respectively twice and three times more likely than their German counterparts to use group R&D resources. 12 There is, nevertheless, a correlation coefficient of approximately 0.5 between the presence of inhouse R&D and the likelihood of innovation for plants in each country.
1993). However, there is also evidence that the motivation of innovating plants for becoming involved in networking varied between the sample countries, with German plants putting much more emphasis on cost sharing and risk reduction, while the UK and Irish plants putting a higher priority on accessing the expertise of other plants and especially to accelerating the innovation process (Figure 1 ).
It was argued earlier that the present research views innovation principally as a business process rather than a technological process. This suggests that some emphasis should be placed on the organisational aspects of innovation, including internal co-ordination, a topic on which traditional economics models of innovation are largely silent. However, recent models of the innovation process have emphasised the internal network character of innovation, and the importance of feedback between internal functions such as marketing and R&D (e.g. Rosenberg, 1982; Bonnett, 1986) . Table 5 gives details of the proportion of innovative enterprises involving a variety of functional groups at each key stage of the innovation process. As before, there are substantial national differences in the internal organisation of innovation. Most notable is the much heavier use of design staff throughout the product innovation process by UK and Irish plants than by German plants -indeed, the German sample is notable for the relatively small input of design staff even in aspects of the process which might be considered design-intensive, such as prototype development. Equally marked is the dominance of marketing and sales staff in the initial stages of the product development process among innovating plants in Ireland and the UK: in the earliest stage (identification of new products) over 80 per cent of responding plants from these countries indicated that there was marketing involvement, compared with 61 per cent in Germany.
The relatively high level of involvement of design and marketing staff suggests that British and Irish firms see innovation as a response to market demand and opportunities, which is consistent with their more market-oriented use of collaborative mechanisms highlighted earlier, and with and their view of collaboration and/or networking principally as a means of speeding up the process of bringing new products to the market. By contrast, the German emphasis is on technical considerations: Table 5 indicates a much heavier use of engineering and technical staff among German innovators in the first three stages of the innovation process. This too is consistent with the findings on networking discussed earlier, where the use of collaboration to reduce risk and share costs rather than accelerate innovation is consistent with an emphasis on core manufacturing and technological competencies rather than a more market-oriented attitude.
Discussion: Innovation, Networks and Institutions
Several key points emerge from this description of the PDS. First, R&D is important, but by no means necessary, for innovation at the plant level. Other mechanisms, such as technology transfer from other group enterprises or collaborative/networking relationships with other enterprises can assume the role traditionally seen as the reserve of R&D. Secondly, where there is in-house R&D being carried out, among German plants this is much more likely to be organised as a formal R&D department than is the case among respondents from the other countries. Thirdly, there is evidence that patterns of networking vary substantially between plants from the three countries: German innovating manufacturers are more likely to make use of explicit collaborative mechanisms, while those in Ireland and the UK both make more use of a market-oriented subcontracting approach and are more frequent users of technology transfer mechanisms. Fourthly, while UK and Irish firms stress access to othersí expertise and acceleration of the innovation process as the principal reasons for networking relationships, German plants put much more emphasis on the more technical and cost-oriented aspects of collaboration, such as risk-sharing. Finally, British and Irish innovatorsí internal organisation of the innovation process differs markedly from that of their German counterparts, with much greater emphasis on marketing and design input in the earlier stages of the process, while German plants place more stress on engineering and technical staff inputs.
It is possible to relate these patterns of innovation organisation to the theoretical developments outlined earlier.
In particular, the differential use of technology transfer and networking arrangements among German, British and Irish firms suggests a difference in attitudes to the potential problems of property rights and transaction costs which may be experienced during innovation. The German emphasis on cost and risk-sharing, and their high use of collaboration suggests they see such mechanisms as having relatively low dangers in terms of dissipation of property rights; they are prepared to accept the lower levels of control which collaboration may give compared with other mechanisms in return for the higher perceived rewards. The knowledge generated by R&D activity is inherently 'leaky', and there is always the danger that firms which have not contributed to the research may free-ride on its benefits. One method of controlling freerider problems which can arise in such situations is to involve potential competitors which could benefit from the research and development work being undertaken, and the German emphasis on the technical rather than market aspects of the innovation process indicates that this may be another reason for their preference for inter-firm collaboration. British and Irish firms, on the other hand, display a more market-oriented approach which emphasises acceleration of the innovation process and accessing other firms' expertise. This results in less use of collaboration, and more use of mechanisms where the degree of control over technology and the resulting property rights is much higher: technology transfer attenuates the danger of dissipation and free-riding by keeping the technology and tacit knowledge within the group, while subcontracting relationships are useful for maintaining tight control over the use of knowledge and technology because of the clearly delineated nature of both parties' involvement in the contracting process.
There is evidence from other research that these patterns and attitudes run deep within the institutional framework of German and British manufacturing. In an examination of the social regulation of inter-firm relations in the two countries, Lane (1997) finds that although German systems of rule-setting and regulation are highly formalised, this does not supersede more informal relationships. German manufacturing companies develop longer-term and closer relationships with their suppliers and customers than their British counterparts, which in turn encourages technological collaboration. By contrast, the British system of relations between firms does not encourage such behaviour:
ìThe establishment and maintenance of effective supplier relations entails higher transaction costs for the firms engaged at every stage of the relationship. The absence of reliable mechanisms of risk reduction makes British managers view long-term commitments with greater wariness than their German counterparts. Close relations of technical collaboration, based on mutual trust, seem to be regarded as less feasible in the British social context.î (p.
214)
This work, and the findings of the PDS, suggest a somewhat different perspective on transaction costs and property rights from that to be found in some of the empirical research reviewed earlier.
For example, Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1996) argue that collaboration is to be found mainly among weak innovators, because these are the firms which are obliged to share the results of research with others, while Arvanitis and Hollenstein (1996) suggest that collaboration is principally a small firm phenomenon, because such firms lack the internal resources to engage in research and the resulting innovation on their own. Neither of these hypotheses is supported by the PDS data. The prevalence of innovation among German plants of all sizes and their extensive use of collaborative networks suggests that it is unlikely that only the weakly innovative employ this mechanism. And it can easily be shown that collaboration is not the preserve of the smaller enterprise. Table 6 shows the extent of collaboration in five phases of the innovation process among British and German plants both for the sample as a whole and for establishments with fewer than 100 employees. For both countries there is no evidence of greater collaboration among small plants, with the exception of production engineering in both cases. The different national patterns are unlikely to be due simply to different incidences of ëweakí innovators, of small plants, or of other firm-level or plant-level factors; they are embedded firmly in the institutional framework of the countries of which they are part.
Conclusions
This study has drawn heavily on the Product Development Survey, a postal survey of manufacturing plants in the UK, Germany and Ireland. Although relatively large scale, there are clearly limitations to research of this kind. Although the present research has attempted to examine both internal and external networks, the stress has been very heavily on formal relationships. No light can be shed from research of this kind on the importance of the informal links which Conway (1995) identifies as being important for the innovation process. And it is impossible to say at this stage whether the network patterns discussed above are responsible for the different innovation output performance of firms in the three countries, although there are a priori grounds for believing this may be the case. Love and Roper (1999) show the importance of technology transfer and networking as a determinant of innovation for the UK firms in the sample, and given the markedly different manner in which German firms organise their innovation inputs it would be surprising if this did not have some effect on innovation performance: work is ongoing which should shed some light on this issue. For example, Lane (1997) finds that the technological collaboration fostered by close inter-firm relationships in Germany may have assisted in innovation development, at least of an incremental, non-radical nature.
Despite these limitations it is nevertheless possible to draw three conclusions. First, the traditional economics perspective does overestimate the role of R&D: other institutional arrangements can substitute for R&D in the innovation process. Secondly, it is possible to retain an economics perspective while examining at least some aspects of the role of networks in innovation: but this involves adopting a broader view of what constitutes the innovation process than is normally permitted in the 'innovation production function' perspective. Finally, and more tentatively, there are national differences in the internal and external organisation of the innovation process which appear to be linked to different institutional structures in the UK and Germany, and to different 
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